1. roundworm 회충

2. infestation 침략, 횡행, (기생충 등의) 체내 침입

3. anemia 빈혈증

4. defecation 정화, 배변

5. defecate 배변하다, 대변을 보다

6. fecal-borne disease 대변매개 질병

7. contract fecal-borne disease 대변매개 질병에 걸리다

8. fecal-borne parasite 대변매개기생충

9. gastrointestinal 위장의

10. forge 구축하다, 위조하다 (counterfeit)

 

2020/03/24 - [영어공부/Daily Vocab.] - [2020-03-23-Mon] Today's Vocabulary

1. renege (약속, 합의 등을) 어기다 (저버리다, 취소하다)

2. scanty 부족한, 빈약한

3. falter 불안정해지다, 흔들리다 (waver)

4. boon and bane : Something that is both a benefit and an affliction

5. boon 요긴한 것

6. bane 골칫거리

 

2020/03/23 - [영어공부/Daily Vocab.] - [2020-03-22-Sun] Today's Vocabulary

1. comorbidity (한 환자가) 두 만성질환을 동시에 앓는 상태

2. material hardship 물자부족

3. stub out 비벼끄다

4. colonoscoy 결장경 검사(법)

5. perinatal 주산기, 출산 전부

6. hospice 말기환자용 병원

7. by and large 대체로

8. capitation 인두세

 

2020/03/22 - [영어공부/Daily Vocab.] - [2020-03-21-Sat] Today's Vocabulary

1. preach 설교(하다)

2. harbinger (흔히 좋지 않은 일이 곧 일어날) 징조

3. porterage 운임, 운반, 운임료

4. mirage 신기루

5. ontology 존재론

6. pertussis 백일해

7. transactional sex 성매매

8. uterus 자궁 (=womb)

9. hysterectomy 자궁절제술

10. paralytic 마비된

1. backlash (사회변화 등에 대한 대중의) 반발

2. staple crops 주요 작물[곡물], 주곡 (basic [primary] crops)

3. cash crops 돈벌이 작물, 환금작물 (subsistence)

4. undulating 물결 모양의, 올라갔다 내려갔다 하는

5. terrain 지형, 지역

6. provenance 기원, 출처

7. woe 고민, 문제

8. debunk (생각, 믿음 등이) 틀렸음을 드러내다

  - debunk the myth 미신의 정체를 폭로하다

9. diaspora 대이동, 집단 대이동

10. Typology 유형분류체계

 

2020/03/19 - [영어공부/Daily Vocab.] - [2020-03-19-Thu] Today's Vocabulary

 

 

1. thrift 절약

2. patronage (화가, 작가등에 대한) 후원

3. gestation 임신, 임신기간

4. gestational 임신의 (임신기간의)

5. contestation 논쟁

6. defy 반항하다

7. lacuna (이론, 글, 생각) 빈틈, 공간 (=gap)

8. precarity 안정성이 없는 존재상태

9. peculiarity 특이 사항

10. dissent 반대, 반대의견

The day the world stopped
Governments are still struggling to get ahead of the coronavirus

Mar 17th 2020

세계가 멈춘 날: 정부들은 여전히 코로나와의 싸움에서 이기기 위해 고군분투 하고 있다.

get ahead of :  1. [경쟁자 따위]를 앞지르다(surpass), ~을 능가하다(outdo), 2. [빚]을 갚다, 청산하다, [일 따위]를 제때 처리하다.  

 

Editor’s note: The Economist is making this story about the covid-19 pandemic available free to all readers. For more coverage visit our coronavirus hub and register for our newsletters.

편집자 주: 이코노미스트는 구독자들에게 코로나 19 (covid-19) 대유행에 관한 소식을 무료로 제공한다. 더 많은 내용을 보려면 코로나바이러스 허브 (coronavirus hub)를 방문해서 뉴스레터에 등록하세요.

 

OF THE SUPPOSED five stages of grief, humanity’s response to the covid-19 pandemic has seemed stuck in the first three: denial (it will not happen to us), anger (it’s another country’s fault, or our government’s) and bargaining (if we make modest changes to our ways of life, it will leave us alone). Monday March 16th may have been the day when the last vestiges of these coping strategies evaporated. Much of the world moved on to the next stage, depression—the heart-sinking realisation that billions of lives will be seriously disrupted for weeks and probably months; that, before it is over, many people will die; and that the economic implications are beyond dire. (For more coverage of covid-19 see our coronavirus hub.)

 

As stockmarkets in America experienced one of the worst days in their history, in many countries the incremental stepping up of relatively modest measures against the virus gave way to Draconian restrictions on travel and on daily life. This seemed to resolve a debate between advocates of two very different approaches.

Some Western governments, notably America’s and Britain’s, had adopted much milder measures. Britain’s apparently calculated that, since the worst was still to come, there was no point in sowing panic and resentment among its people by imposing restrictions that were still premature. Both countries were slow to institute widespread testing to get a better sense of how many people were already infected. “Relax, we’re doing great,” President Donald Trump told Americans on March 15th. In contrast, three days earlier, Boris Johnson, Britain’s prime minister, had called the pandemic “the worst public-health crisis for a generation” but his government’s response did not involve closing schools, as many countries had done, nor banning mass gatherings.

 

Other countries had already instituted harsher measures, and seemed to have had some success. The central Chinese province of Hubei, home to 60m people, had in effect been in quarantine for nearly two months. South Korea had tested hundreds of thousands of people and enabled people to check whether they might have had contact with the infected on a website showing their movements. European countries had begun also to shut down, starting with Italy, site of the continent’s worst outbreak.

 

In recent days, China has started easing restrictions and is cautiously hailing at least a partial victory over the virus. But that may be premature, as a second wave of infections re-imported from abroad remains possible. Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan have this week seen renewed infections after apparently suppressing the virus’s spread.

After March 16th, the differences between countries seem less stark. Mr Johnson told people to work from home if they can, not to hold big gatherings, to steer clear of pubs and restaurants and to quarantine their whole households for 14 days if one member shows symptoms of infection (schools remained open for the time being). The change in approach was justified by saying, “It looks as though we’re now approaching the fast growth part of the upward curve”, and, in other briefings, by alarm at new data showing the extent of the crisis in Italy. Britain is also discouraging non-essential travel, but has not banned it. The same day in America, Mr Trump issued tighter new guidelines, including that people should avoid gatherings of ten or more people. In France, President Emmanuel Macron declared “we are at war” with the virus.

 

Meanwhile, the number of countries closing their borders to arrivals from countries with infections has grown to over 80, including America, Australia, Canada, Japan, Russia. They also include members of the European Union and of the Schengen free-travel zone, which approved a 30-day closure of their external borders.

 

A joint statement on March 16th from leaders of the G7 seemed to herald a new phase of welcome international co-operation after a period when squabbling seemed more noticeable than co-ordination. It promised “a strongly co-ordinated international approach, based on science and evidence.” But even that appeared to want to make a political point, adding that the approach should be “consistent with our democratic values and utilising the strengths of private enterprise”, as if to add: “Are you listening, China?”

 

In fact, the boasts of international solidarity and a shared approach are hollow. Countries are still pursuing divergent strategies, and in some cases banning exports of medical supplies. They seem to be competing to show that their method stands the best chance of success. Not long after Mr Johnson announced Britain’s latest measures, for example, Mr Macron unveiled France’s much more sweeping approach. From March 17th nobody is to leave their home except to shop for essentials, attend medical appointments, or do jobs that cannot be done at home. Schools, universities, cafés, cinemas, hairdressers and museums had already closed.

 

The world’s two most powerful countries, America and China, are meanwhile indulging in a blame game. Also on March 16th Mr Trump irritated China’s leaders by referring to “the Chinese virus”. China’s foreign-ministry spokesman urged America to stop the “despicable practice” of stigmatising China. But Chinese officials have also been guilty, with one lending his name to a bizarre online conspiracy theory that the virus was made by the American army and brought into China. Tensions between the two countries worsened on March 17th when China announced it was expelling reporters from the New York Times, Washington Post and Wall Street Journal. It described the move as “reciprocal”—a response to Mr Trump’s decision last month to cap the numbers in America of journalists working for five state-controlled Chinese news outlets.

 

If international co-operation on the battle against the virus is going badly, then at least central banks and other monetary authorities are working in cahoots to contain the economic fall-out. The move by America’s Federal Reserve to cut interest rates to close to zero in an emergency intervention on March 15th is in lockstep with the decisions of many other central banks. The record-setting crash on the American stockmarkets the following day was a reflection of how little impact investors and traders think monetary policy can have on the recession—or even depression—that may be looming.

 

More important are central banks’ efforts to keep credit flowing before companies and the banks they owe money to seize up. On March 17th the Fed announced that, as during the financial crisis of 2008-09, it will start buying up companies’ short-term debt (“commercial paper”). But in the end, the banks and companies are probably going to need their governments’ help—either to spend directly to keep businesses open, or to provide guarantees to the banks.

 

Most big economies have announced—or are about to unveil—big spending packages to support the economy. Also on March 17th Britain’s finance minister, Rishi Sunak, promised £330bn ($400bn) in lending, grants and guarantees to keep businesses going through the virus-induced slump. France has promised €45bn ($50bn) to help businesses. Mr Trump’s administration wants Congress to approve $1trn in extra spending.

The plight of financial institutions is not yet nearly as bad as it was during the global financial crisis. But the disagreements over how to handle covid-19 and how to attribute blame for its spread do not augur well for future co-operation to stop financial systems sinking to those lows. And, in the meantime, every antiviral and economic measure governments introduce seems to serve partly to heighten the sense that policymakers are floundering against an adversary they still do not understand; and hence to worsen the mounting panic.

 

링크: https://www.economist.com/international/2020/03/17/governments-are-still-struggling-to-get-ahead-of-the-coronavirus

출처: The Economist

 

1. disruptive 지장을 주는

2. deleterious 해로운

3. instigator 선동자

4. labile 불안정한

5. delinquent 비해의, 범죄 성향을 보이는

6. dyad 한 쌍, 이수

7. proband (유전) 발단자 (이상 유전 형질을 가진 가계의 출발점으로 선정된 사람)

8. recanalization 재소통 (기능 상실된 혈관, 수정관을 회복시키기)

9. capillary 모세혈관

10. contagion 전염, 감염

 

2020/03/18 - [영어공부/Daily Vocab.] - [2020.03.17.Tue] Today's Vocabulary

1. amputation 절단

2. concordance 유사, 일치

3. discharge 해고하다, 방출, 배출

4. surrogate 대리의, 대용의

5. elicitation 도출, 꾀어내기

6. syphilis 매독

7. congenital 선천적인

8. ulcer 궤양

9. dementia 치매

10. puberty 사춘기

 

 

Free exchange: The worth of nationsEconomists focus too little on what people really care about

The fourth in our series on the profession’s shortcomings

 

 

Print edition | Finance and Economics

May 3rd 2018

 

A CYNIC, says one of Oscar Wilde’s characters, is a man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing. But, as philosophers have long known, assigning values to things or situations is fraught. Like the cynic, economists often assume that prices are all anyone needs to know. This biases many of their conclusions, and limits their relevance to some of the most serious issues facing humanity.

 

The problem of value has lurked in the background ever since the dismal science’s origins. Around the time Adam Smith published his “Wealth of Nations”, Jeremy Bentham laid out the basis of a utilitarian approach, in which “it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong”. In the late 19th century Alfred Marshall declared the correct focus of economics to be the “attainment and…use of material requisites of well-being”. Or, as his student, Arthur Pigou, put it, “that part of social welfare that can be brought directly or indirectly into relation with the measuring rod of money”.

 

Equating money with value is in many cases a necessary expedient. People make transactions with money, of one form or another, rather than “utility” or happiness. But even if economists often have no choice but to judge outcomes in terms of who ends up with how many dollars, they can pay more attention to the way focusing on “material well-being”, as determined by the “measuring rod of money”, influences and constrains their work.

 

The measuring rod itself often causes trouble. Not every dollar is of equal value, for instance. You might think that if two economists were forced to bid on an apple, the winner would desire the apple more and the auction would thereby have found the best, welfare-maximising use for the apple. But the evidence suggests that money has diminishing marginal value: the more you have, the less you value an extra dollar. The winner might therefore end up with the apple not because it will bring him more joy, but because his greater wealth means that his bid is less of a sacrifice. Economists are aware of this problem. It features, for example, in debates about the link between income and happiness across countries. But the profession is surprisingly casual about its potential implications: for example, that as inequality rises, the price mechanism may do a worse job of allocating resources.

 

Equating dollar costs with value misleads in other ways. That economic statistics such as GDP are flawed is not news. In a speech in 1968 Robert Kennedy complained that measures of output include spending on cigarette advertisements, napalm and the like, while omitting the quality of children’s health and education. Despite efforts to improve such statistics, these problems remain. A dollar spent on financial services or a pricey medical test counts towards GDP whether or not it contributes to human welfare. Social costs such as pollution are omitted. Economists try to take account of such costs in other contexts, for example when assessing the harms caused by climate change. Yet even then they often focus on how environmental change will affect measurable production and neglect outcomes that cannot easily be set against the measuring rod.

 

Economists also generally ignore the value of non-market activity, like unpaid work. By one estimate, including unpaid work in American GDP in 2010 would have raised its value by 26% (and drawn a very different picture of the contributions of different demographic groups). As Diane Coyle of Cambridge University has argued, the decision to exclude unpaid work may reflect the value judgments of the (mostly male) officials who first ran statistical agencies. But it seems likely that economists today still treat things which cannot easily be measured as if they matter less.

 

Economists are at their least useful when a measuring stick should not be used at all. They have been known to calculate, for example, the financial gains from achieving gender equality. But gender equality has an intrinsic value, regardless of its impact on GDP. Similarly, species loss and forced mass migration impose psychic costs that resist dollar valuation but are nonetheless important aspects of the threat from climate change.

 

Such quandaries might suggest that ethical issues should be left to other social scientists. But that division of labour would be untenable. Indeed, economists often work on the basis that tangible costs and benefits outweigh subjective values. Alvin Roth, for example, suggests that moral qualms about “repugnant transactions” (such as trading in human organs) should be swept aside in order to realise the welfare gains that a market in organs would generate. Perhaps so, but to draw that conclusion while dismissing such concerns, rather than treating them as principles which might also contribute to human well-being, is inappropriate. Further, the very act of pulling out the measuring rod alters our sense of value. Though the size of the effect is disputed, psychological research suggests that nudging people to think in terms of money when they make a choice encourages a “businesslike mindset” that is less trusting and generous. Expanding the reach of markets is not just a way to satisfy preferences more efficiently. Rather, it favours market-oriented values over others.

 

The Pharrell Williams school

Some economists advocate the creation and use of broader measures of well-being. Several organisations, including the European Commission and the World Bank, now publish data series presenting a more comprehensive picture of social health. But the costs of the standard approach are growing. Price is a poor measure of the value of digital goods and services, which are often paid for by giving access to data. Technological progress promises to create ever more situations in which ethical considerations conflict with narrowly material ones. The question of how to increase well-being in such a world deserves greater attention.

This article appeared in the Finance and economics section of the print edition under the headline"The worth of nations"

 

출처: The Economist

 

 

2017/04/07 - [공부/영문기사] - Donald Trump strikes at Syria’s Assad

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